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PULFILLMENT OF 1948 RATERCAD PLAN

Vukan Dj. Desic

Fulfillment of the 1948 plan for the Yugoslav railroads is shown in the following table:

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106
104
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126.5
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en est e	e se en una energia en euro e di emplacemento. La con-	Planned	Actual	Percent Fulfilled
10.	Average load of freight cars (tons)	11.9	12.4	104
11.	Turnaround time of cars (days)	5.1	5.6	90
12.	Average static load per axle (to	me) 5,44	6,2	112
13.	Average dynamic load per axle (tons)	5.22	5 , 58	109
14.	Coefficient of operation of empty freight cars	0.4	0.397	101
1 5.	Coefficient of irregularity [lateness] in transportation	1.3	1,2	108
1 6.	Productivity of labor per transportation employee funit not given/	46,900	144,049	98

During 1948, the cost per reduced net ton-kilometer was lowered by 13 percent.

Although the plan has been exceeded for both quantity and quality of service, Yugoslav rail transportation still does not fully meet the needs of the economy, much less of pleasure travel.

In 1959, the year of greatest transport service before the war, freight transportation reached 4,700,000,000 ton-kilometers. In 1948 it reached 7,570,000,000 ton-kilometers, an increase of 61 percent, or of 75 percent in tens of freight. This increase took place under conditions far inferior to those of 1939, as a result of heavy traffic and lack of maintenance between 1941 and 1944.

In 1948, transportation of specific commodities increased as follows (1939 - 100): coal 184, ore 15?, products of ferrous metallurgy 156, raw and processed wood 170, firewood 107, cement and gypsum 303, other building materials 222, grain and causal products 127, sugar beets 144, and other freight 169, the total increase was 173.

Passenger transportation increased from 3,250,000,000 passenger-kilometers in 1959 to 6,809,000,000 in 1948, an increase of 112 percent, or of 152 percent in the number of passengers carried. Yet conditions for passenger transportation were even worse than for freight. In 1948 the inventory of passenger railroad equipment was only 82 percent of the 1939 total.

During the second half of 1948 the Yugoslav railroads suffered from a particularly difficult internal crisis of a technical and organizational nature, which affected to some extent their ability to meet economic needs. It was reflected chiefly in:

- 1. Slower circulation of trains, because of congestion in the more important railroad yards
 - 2. Pronounced lateness of trains, resulting from impeded circulation
- Increased turnover time of cars and locomotives, which produced an artificial shortage of cars, locomotives, and personnel

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- 1 Overburdening of operational personnel -
- 5. Late and insufficient freight service.

Until 1948 it was possible to compensate for technical deficiencies through greater effort on the part of the workers and a number of organizational measures. However, these were no longer sufficient to cenceal the meet serious defects, especially:

- 1. Technical backwardness inherited from prewar Yugoslavia (old types of locemotives and cars, obsolete equipment, lew level of maintenance, lack of mechanical equipment to expedite freight handling during leading, unleading, releading, etc.)
- 2. The poor condition of available equipment, as a result of damage, inadequate maintenance, and overloading during the war (stepgap repairs on tracks, bridges, and other installations, high percentage of rotting ties, overloading of relling stock, etc.)

During the fall campaign of 1948, the greatest defect was the lack of double track on the Belgrade -- Zagreb main line. The main reason for deterieration of circulation was the insufficient capacity of certain sections of the line, and especially the low capacity of the classification stations. Of course, stoppages on this line were necessarily reflected in the entire railroad net. Construction of the double track had greatly facilitated the movement of trains by the beginning of 1949, and total latences of trains dropped 75 percent.

The following erganizational defects in the Yugoslav railread system have become evident:

- 1. Insufficient Operational efficiency, or poor reaction to the various problems that manifest themselves in transportation, such as frequent and improper reductions in the amount of freight to be shipped. One reason for this was that management was too far removed from operational personnel: Ministry of Transportation (Ministarstvo Saebracaj), General Administration of Railroads (Generalma Direkcija Zeleznica), Main Administration of Operation (Glavas Direkcija Eksploatacije), track sectors (pruzmi sektor), operational elements (izvrsme jedinice). The formation of the Ministry of Railfoads and the Ministry of Transportation and increased organizational experience made possible a new and much more satisfactory organization: Ministry of Railroads, Main Administration, operational elements.
- 2. Administrative inflexibility and bureaucratic precedure within transpert agencies and in relations between transpert agencies and enterprises. A long and hard struggle will be necessary to eliminate this.
- Am improper attitude by the users of transportation toward transpertation, resulting in peerly organized use of railreads.

Nevertheless, in 1948 the railreads fulfilled their plum on time, as a result principally of the planaed use of equipment. Thus, for example, in 1948 the static lead of freight cars exceeded the plan by 13.9 percent[sic]. Reconstruction of railread lines to withstand greater axle pressure and construction of new types of relling stock are creating new reserves for the development of transportation.

In turnaround time, the plan failed by 9 percent sic. Construction of medera technical facilities for handling freight by machinery is producing a substantial improvement in turnaround time. The same is true for irregularity of transportation, the coefficient of empty cars and locomotives sic in movement, dynamic loading per axle, etc.

- 3 -

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The railroad workshops, which assemble rolling stock and install equipment, are organized as though they were independent enterprises. These workshops include shops for the repair of rolling stock, shops for the manufacture of spare parts, lathe shops, plants for impregnating ties, etc. Their production in 1948 is shown below, in terms of costs expressed in thousands of dinars:

Branch of Service	Service	Plan	Actual Production	Percent of Ful- fillment
111	Production of electric power	3,840	3,220	84.5
117	Metal products industry and metal processing	1,953,500	2,054 ,68 3	105.5
119	Electrical equipment industr	y 414	404	98
121	Building materials industry	123,537	123,041	100
122	Wood industry	292,418	203,455	70
124	Textile industry	1,011	1,120	110
126	Rubber industry	90	103	115
128	Printing industry	32,714	35,920	110
v	•	2,407,524	2,421,951	101

... Although these railroad industrial enterprises fulfilled their plans, the following weaknesses are evident in their operation:

- 1. Improper utilization of personnel and production capacity
- 2. Low level of engineering operations
- Insufficient acceptance of new methods of work and stubborn retention of obsolete standards for utilizing manpower and materials.

The basic plan for the construction of new railroad track and installations and the rebuilding of old in 1948 called for 2,778,522,000 dinars' worth of construction. Including upplanned projects, 3,590,416,000 dinars' worth of construction was done, and the plan was exceeded 29 percent.

However, the following defects are apparent in this branch of the railroad industry:

- 1. Improper utilization of available capacity and personnel
- 2. Improper maintenance of machinery
- Absence of realistic norms, etc.
- 4. Inadequate record keeping and supervision of work done.

Typical projects undertaken during 1948 include:

1. Construction and opening to traffic of 498.1 kilometers of railroad line, not counting lines begun in 1948 but not finished, e.g., the Sabac--Koviljaca line, which was completed except for laying the track

- 4 - BESTRICTED

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- 2. Earthwork completed: 2,549,214 cubic meters; concrete used in construction: 74,146 cubic meters
- 3. Opening to traffic of 58 tunnels, totaling 21,614 meters in length. Of these, 20 tunnels, with a total length of 4,910 meters, were built in 1948.
- 4. Opening to traffic of 74 bridges, with a total length of 1,66% meters, and 670 culverts. Of these, 53 bridges, with a total length of 1,340 meters, and 327 culverts were built in 1948. Also 24,731 cubic meters of drainage were built.
- In the construction of tracks and track installations, 28,990,600 norm hours of skilled and unskilled labor were used.

The most important lines opened to traffic during 1948 are: Bihac.-Enin, 115 kilometers, 29 November; Kursumlija--Pristina, 70.8 kilometers,
7 July; Biksic--Titograd, 56 kilometers, 13 July; Rit--Ovca--Kisvara, 30.4
kilometers, 20 October; Encevo-Brodica, 16 kilometers, 29 November; Ljubija-Brezicani, 15 kilometers, 15 April; Sezana--Dutovlje, 7.1 kilometers, 23
December; and Tuzla--Kreka, 4 kilometers, 18 October.

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